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The recent global financial crisis may have
lessons for ecologists. One driver of the
problems many countries faced toward
the end of the previous decade was risky
speculation by larger banks (Okamoto,
2009). In cases where such investments
succeed, the bank is the winner. When
such investments fail they have the poten-
tial to ruin the bank. However, the largest
banks are often deemed to be so important
to national economies that the optimal
(short-term) strategy for governments is
to bail them out when they are in danger
of going under, that is, they are “too big to
fail” (Kaufman, 1990). This tactic becomes
problematic when banks start to base their
investment behavior on the assumption
that governments will provide a safety net,
by investing more riskily than they would
do otherwise. Banks then receive all of the
benefit of high-risk investment, but bear
less of the cost than they would do oth-
erwise, since bailouts are funded through
public tax. This tendency of one party to
engage in more risky behavior when costs
(risks) and benefits are not shared equally
is known in economic theory as “moral
hazard” (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979).
Situations in which parties are exposed
to moral hazard are potentially common
in ecology. Individuals of the same species
often cooperate in joint ventures requir-
ing investment from both parties, such as
foraging and raising offspring. An exam-
ple of this is seen in cooperative hunting
in lions in which individuals commonly
take the same position in the hunting
pack (Stander, 1992). “Wingers” run at
the edge of the line of advancing lions
during hunts while “centers” take middle
positions. Centers more often make the
kill than wingers, an activity that brings a
risk of injury. It would be predicted that
since wingers are exposed to less risk, they
should be more willing to initiate hunts,
even on risky prey, since they are unlikely
to have to make the kill. This is borne out
by the fact that wingers initiate hunts more
frequently. However, this was not tested in
relation to degree of risk presented by the
prey in the original analysis; centers should
bemore willing to initiate non-risky hunts,
while wingers should be more willing to
initiate hunts on more feisty prey items.
Understanding who has the power to take
risks in these situations is important. The
individual that is exposed to less risk may
attempt to coerce other group members
into making risky investments.
In addition to applying to predators
that hunt cooperatively, these conflicts
with regard to collective risk-taking poten-
tially arise during a range of other ecologi-
cal interactions. Behavior of prey in groups
might also expose some group members
to moral hazard. For example, in a herd
of foraging herbivorous mammals, faster
group members are more likely to want
to forage in areas with higher predation
risk, since they are better able to escape
predators. Again the benefits would be
similar for fast and slow group members,
but slower group members bear the risk
of the activity disproportionately. Joint
ventures between individuals of different
species might also lead to conflicts of this
kind. In interspecific mutualisms, such as
those between ants and their host plants
[e.g., the ant-Acacia system (Palmer et al.,
2008)], increased host growth might allow
extra symbiont reproduction at increased
risk to the host, although with potential
payoffs to the host of extra growth as
well. The potential for conflicts to occur
when groups make consensus decisions
is well documented (Conradt and Roper,
2005; Couzin et al., 2005). However, moral
hazard relates specifically to asymmetries
both in the power to take risks and to
exposure to costs when such gambles
do not pay off. Hence ecological moral
hazard can be thought of as a partic-
ular kind of consensus decision making
conflict.
Thus, thinking about interactions in
terms of moral hazard is a useful exer-
cise, as it enables predictions to be made
about the decisions made by individu-
als. It is expected that moral hazard will
be a factor in interactions between indi-
viduals in which there is an asymme-
try in the risks of a particular behavior
and for which any individual can initi-
ate that action. This is likely to mean
that considerations of moral hazard may
be important across a wide range of eco-
logical interactions. Asymmetries in risks
and power are known to be important in
economics (Okamoto, 2009) and under-
standing the politics of climate change
(Samson et al., 2011). I suggest that inves-
tigation of the prevalence of moral hazard
in ecological interactions between individ-
uals could be a fruitful direction for future
research.
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